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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
SMITH BROTHERS LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM E. JOHNSON and his wife, 
LILA JOHNSON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No.10701 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff to enforce a 
Mechanic's Lien against the defendants, one of whom, 
William E. Johnson, purchased or rather acquired the 
property in a real estate transaction, during the time 
plaintiff had an effective and valid lien against the pre-
mises for materials delivered and actually used in the 
improvements then being made upon the premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of 
foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien rendered in favor of plain-
tiff and against the defendant based on a written stipula-
tion entered into between the parties hereto which sub-
mits only one question so far as this appeal is concerned, 
to-wit: 
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"Is the plaintiff, who supplied the materials directly 
to the owner of the property, the Skabelunds, under 
Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics Lien, UCA 1953, as 
amended, an original contractor and entitled to 80 
days within which to file said lien," or, "Is plaintiff 
other than an original contractor under 38-1-7 UCA 
1953 and only entitled to 60 days?" 
The defendants appeal from the decision of the lower 
court holding plaintiff to be an original contractor and 
entitled to 80 days within which to file the Notice of 
Intention to Claim a Lien. The lien was found to have 
been recorded well within the 80 day period. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower 
court's decision, with costs, and for such further action 
then to be taken by the lower court as provided by the 
terms of said Stipulation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent believes appellants' statement of facts to 
be ample and fair, except as hereinafter pointed out, and 
so agree with them, but in this regard beleives it proper 
to again draw this court's attention to the fact that the 
judgment and decree and findings and conclusions entered 
herein are based upon the written Stipulation entered 
into between the parties by the terms of which there is 
only su'Pmitted the above questions which divides the 
parties, the Stipulation further providing that in the event 
of an appeal to this court and an affirmance by this court, 
that then the judgment of the lower court shall include 
-2-
costs and attorney's fees as provided by law and the cus-
tom of the court, and in the event of a reversal by this 
court, then the lower court shall proceed further as to 
whether or not the defendants are entitled to any recovery 
upon their counterclaim filed therein and if so, how much. 
Appellants state in "The Facts," second paragraph, that 
William E. Johnson purchased the property on which the 
improvements had been made without actual knowledge 
of the outstanding debt. Respondent believes that 
whether or not he so purchased the property is immaterial 
and not within the scope of this appeal but if it has any 
materiality, then it is apparent Johnson purchased the 
property before delivery of the last materials, on August 
6, 1964, and so purchased it before completion of the 
improvements and hence the statement "improvements 
had been made" is inaccurate. Improvements were still 
being made when he purchased the property by the 
admitted facts. Both his, Johnson's, senses of smell and 
sight should have advised him of improvements being 
made. Work in prograss is always notice to one dealing 
with the property of the statutory right of the person 
furnishing materials to perfect liens therefor. This com-
ment is made because Respondent beleives whether or not 
Johnson purchased the property without actual knowledge 
of the outstanding debt is immaterial and should form no 
part of the facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1. THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAS AN 
ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR UNDER THE PROVIS-
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IONS OF 38-1-2, UCA, 1953 AND AS SUCH HAD 80 
DAYS WITHIN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE OF IN-
TENTION TO CLAIM A MECHANIC'S LIEN. 
A: Respondent believes that Section 38-1-2, UCA, 1953 
and which reads as follows, is controlling as to whether 
or not it, claimant, is an original contractor, to-wit: 
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. - Who-
ever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, 
express or implied, with the owner, as in this chapter 
provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and 
all other persons doing work or furnishing materials 
shall be deemed subcontractors." 
Following the statute, under Comparable Provision, it 
is pointed out that Iowa Code Ann., Sec. 572.1, Subd 2 
("Subcontractor" includes every person furnishing mater-
ials or performing labor, except those having contracts 
directly with owner, his agent or trustee). There is then 
cited Holbrook v. Webster's Inc. 7 U. (2) 148,320 P. 2d 
661 from which it appears that the answer to the question 
in this lawsuit has been indicated by this court. In this 
case, at page 662, after quoting Sec. 38-1-2 and referring 
to Sec. 38-1-7 entitled Notice of Claim-Contents-Con-
tents-Recording, had this to say: "The trial court did not 
indicate in its Summary Judgment whether or not it found 
that Elvin Coon was the owner of the real estate. If such 
fact were unequivacably established, then appellant was 
necessarily an original contractor." It further appeared 
that Webster's, Inc. furnished the building materials to 
Elvin Coon, et ux, who as mortgagor, gave a mortgage 
to Prudential Savings & Loan Ass'n. who in turn assigned 
the mortgage to Ward C. Holbrook, plaintiff, and in which 
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mortgage, he, the mortgagor, recited that, "the mortgagor 
is lawfully seized of the premises in fee simple and has 
good and lawful right to mortgage, sell and convey the 
same." And the holding by this court was then to the 
effect that having sold and delivered materials to the 
owner of the property, Webster's Inc. was, therefore, 
an original contractor and entitled to 80 days within 
which to fiJe its lien under the provisions of 38-1-7. In 
fact, Holbrook v. Webster's, Inc. is cited under said Sec. 
38-1-7. 
Following Sec. 38-1-2, attention is directed to 36 
Am. Jur. 46, Mechanic's Lien, Sec. 51 wherein it is stated: 
"In order to constitute a lien claimant an original 
contractor, there must exist or have existed a contract, 
either express or implied, between such lien claimant 
and the owner of the property" 
citing Prouty Lbr. & Box Co. v. McGuirk, 156 OR 418, 
66 P (2d) 481, 68 P (2d) 473, citing RCL. And said 
section further provides: 
"One who deals with the party in interest who is the 
source of authority for the improvement is contracting 
with the owner, and not a subcontractor, but is an 
original contractor" 
citing Jordan v. Natrona Lbr. Co. 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P (2d) 
378, citing RLC. See also Freidenbloom v. Pecos Valley 
Lbr. Co., 35 N.M. 154, 290 P 796, 798; Mitchell v. Mc-
Cutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P 1086; Colorado Iron Works 
v. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho 262, 38 P 651, Gray v. New Mexico 
Pumice Store Co., 15 N.M. 478, 110 P 603, and other cases 
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cited at page 385 of the Jordan case, supra. See also 
Words & Phrases Permanent Edition 30, at page 298-299. 
Additional cases are also cited under ORIGINAL CON-
TRACTOR in the 1966 Cumulative Annual Pocket to Vol. 
30, including Lakeview Drilling Co. v. Stark 310 P (2d) 
627, 630, 210 Ore. 306; Anderson v. Chambliss, 262 P 
( 2d), 298, 299, 199 Or. 400. It will be observed from a 
reading of the case cited that decisions based on statutes 
such as 38-1-2 are in harmony with the holding in the Utah 
case of Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., supra. 
B: Sec. 38-1-3, Those entitled to lien-so far as ap-
plicable to the case at bar provides: 
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons perform-
ing labor on, or furnishing materials to be used in, 
the construction or alteration of or addition to, or 
repair of, any building, structure or improvement 
upon land;" 
and then it further provides, "shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished mater-
ials, for the value of the service rendered, labor per-
formed or materials furnished by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other 
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor 
or otherwise." 
The purpose of the lien stah1te is to protect those 
therein enumerated who have added directly to the value 
of the property by performance of labor or adding mater-
ials and is designed to prevent the landowner from taking 
the benefit of improvements without paying therefor. 
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Stanton Transporation Co. v. Davis 9 U ( 2) 184, 341 P 
(2d) 207; King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 U 
(2d) 339, 374 p (2) 254. 
I have italicised part of the statute above quoted 
to point out that the statute does not specifically "define," 
"classify," "contemplate" or "create four classes"-con-
tractors, subcontractors, "LABORERS BY THE DAY OR 
PIECE" and "MATERIALMEN" as such. To so contend 
is simply adding two additional designations or classifica-
tions by counsel which are not provided for in the statute 
and which is misleading; because the statute does not so 
provide does not render it either "ambiguous" or "mislead-
ing." The language simply provides for "or covers them" 
each of whom are protected and may be entitled to a lien 
by complying with the provisions thereof. 
Nor does Sec. 38-1-14 providing for the order of satis-
faction in the decree provide any inconsistency in provid-
ing for the following order: ( 1) "Subcontractors who are 
laborers or mechanics working by the day or piece, but 
without furnishing materials therefor." It covers those 
persons, laborers or mechanics, who so work at the request 
of the subcontractors. A subcontractor under our statute, 
38-1-2, is one who does work at the instance of the original 
contractor for it states that "all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors." 
Here there is no subcontractor involved. Respondent 
would come under ( 3) of said section were others ( 1 ) 
and ( 2) involved or not. Respondent sees no inconsist-
cncyency in this classification. It does not attempt to 
change the time allowed for claiming liens under 38-1-7. 
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Undoubtedly the State has a right to provide for the sub-
contractor-order of satisfying claimants. This is consistent 
with the holdings generally, for the persons designated 
in ( 1) and ( 2) could not exceed the claim of the original 
contractor against the owner. See 57 CJS Mechanic's 
Liens, Sec. 319 and also Garland v. Bear Lake and River 
Water Works & Irr. Co. 34 P 368, 9 Utah 350. 40 CJ page 
492, note 7. The mere fact, however, that (2) of said 
section uses the work "materialman" does not preclude 
claimant herein from being an "original contractor." Such 
a classification is logical. Otherwise, as pointed out in 
Colorado Iron Works v. Riekenberg (Idaho) 38 P 651 at 
page 652 the situation could become ridiculous, because 
as stated therein, suppose A, the owner, contracts with 
B to do all the construction work for $5000.00 and then 
contracts with C to furnish all the material for the build-
ing for $10,000.00. Then, if as is claimed by the appellant, 
B is the only "original contractor" and C is only a "mater-
ialman" and both find it necessary to file liens for their 
security, what sort of a position are they in? The amount 
of C's security from B cannot exceed the contract price 
B is to receive for erecting the building and that only 
equals one-half of the contract price agreed to be paid 
by the owner to C for material used in constructing the 
building. This case also holds: "A materialman. who 
contracts directly with the owner, and has no privity of 
interest or cantract with the contractor for construction, 
is an original contractor, under the statute of Idaho, and 
as such is entitled to 60 days provided by satute within 
which to file his lien." Fitzgerald v. Neal, (Ore.) 231 
P 645. See syllabus 14 page 646. "The term, "subcon-
tractor," from its very definition, means one who has 
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contracted with the original contractor for the perform-
ance of all or a part of the work or services which such 
contractor has himself contracted to perform." 
At page 6 of brief, appellant refers to Sec. 45-5-12 
Idaho Code (Judgment to Declare Prority) and then 
states that it is "comparable" to Sec. 38-1-14 and then 
cites Riggens v. Perkins et al (Idaho) 246 P 962. Facts 
in this case disclose that Perkins, owner, entered into a 
contract with Arco Mill & Bldg. Co. by the terms of which 
it agreed to "provide all the materials and to perform all 
the work in erecting the dwelling according to plans and 
specifications." Riggens brought suit to foreclose 8 labor 
liens (himself and 7 assignors) for work done on the 
dwelling. The court held against him because he did 
not deal direct with Perkins and that his contractor, Arco 
Mill & Bldg. Co. was statutory agent for the purpose of 
giving a lien to persons employed by it direct, but not for 
the purpose of making a loborer employed by it the direct 
contract-employee of the owner. See discussion (2) 
first column at page 963. No one disagreed that the 
defendant, Brownell Bros. Co. was entitled to a lien be-
cause all of its dealings were had with the owner's con-
tractor, Arco Mill & Bldg. Co., but the classification given 
was disputed. The court held that as to the materials it 
furnished consisting of paints, hardware and the like in 
the sum of $410.00 it was entitled to a lien under classi-
fication 2 of the statute, but that as to the heating plant 
and its installation it was entitled to a lien under classifi-
cation ( 3) as a subcontractor, and that no reasonable 
theory could support it as having a lien as a laborer. The 
decision also states that Brownell Bros. C. "had such a 
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contract as, if made with Perkins direct, would have made 
the appellant a contractor, not a materialman." See dis-
cussion at ( 3) page 964. The evidence supplied by Gem 
State Lbr. Co. is not given. The only statement contained 
in the case is that which appears at top of second column 
page 964 and which is quoted by appellant at the top of 
page 7 of brief. It is clear from a reading of the case 
that the 1widence produced by Gem State Lbr. Co. was 
that it furnished materials, only, at the request of the con-
tractor, and not the owner. It is clear from the case that 
a labor lien under the Mechanic's Lien statutes as to the 
property being constructed can exist only if furnished 
at the request of the general contractor, and that if sup-
plied at the request of the owner, such laborer then be-
comes an original contractor. See syllabus 5 page 962. 
Nor is counsel's statement, bottom page 5 of brief, justi-
fied by Sec. 38-1-3 when he makes the statement that it 
"contemplates" the classification he makes. Counsel for 
respondent states that the holding in the Riggens v. Perk-
ins case, supra, is a decision in its favor. 
It is believed that the above two paragraphs in par-
ticular and the previous pages of this brief fully answers 
the further contentions made by counsel on pages 7, 8 
and the first half of page 9 of his brief. 
C. The court corrctly held plaintiff, claimant, en-
titled to 80 days after completion of its contract to file 
its Claim under the provisions of Sec. 38-1-7, the first part 
of which provides as follows: "Every original contractor 
within eighty days after completion of his contract," and 
etc ... 
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What else could claimant be other than an original 
contractor? The facts admitted are that defendant is 
owner, the last materials were delivered to him August 6, 
1964, the lien was filed Oct. 7, 1964, well within the 80 
day period, the materials went into the improvement, no 
other person performed labor or furnished any materials 
at the request of either the owner, "or any one acting under 
his authority as agent. contractor, or otherwise," claimant, 
or any other person. Claimant certainly could not be a 
subcontractor. The second paragraph of this section can 
have no application because claimant, the only person 
who could be an original contractor, had no dealings with 
any person, nor did the owner. There is no classification 
making any one who furnishes material, a MATERIAL-
MAN. It is difficult to see how this situation makes this 
paragraph "a useless and confusing provision." It just 
has no application in the case at bar. Jordan v. Natrona 
Lbr. Co., supra, syllabus 4 holds that lumber company 
that furnished materials upon open account was an origi-
nal contractor as against contention that formal precise 
contract states exact amount of materials needed and 
prices to be paid was necessary and that implied contract 
was insufficient. It is believed that what counsel con-
cludes is a "genuine contractor's contract" is a term of his 
own making and has no application. It is a common 
knowledge that contracts for construction are of an end-
less variety, and are both oral and written, express and 
implied, and that they cover labor or material, or both, 
and with all kinds of conditions and limitations. 
Answering Point 1-B: Sec. 38-1-7 does not classify 
lienors in accordance with Sec. 38-1-3. Appellant's state-
-11-
ment that it does is entirely erroneous. As previously 
pointed out herein, neither of these sections CLASSIFY 
LEINORS. Sec. 3 sets out who is entitled to a lien, either 
for labor or materials "whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as 
agent, contractor or otherwise." Section 7 makes no at-
tempt at classification. It does not allow MATERIAL-
MEN as such 60 days from delivery of last material to 
file notice of lien. The right of a person who furnishes 
materials depends on the kind of contract-with whom he 
contracts. See extensive comments in the Idaho case of 
Higgins v. Perkins, supra, which appellant cites and relies 
upon but which respondent believes is a holding in its 
favor. It is believed that what is here and previously 
stated answers fully the columns shown at pages 9 and 
10 of brief. 
36 Am. Jur, Mechanic's Liens, 52 Materialmen, states: 
"All materialmen to be entitled to a lien, must be 
specifically referred to within the statute, for it can-
not be extended to that class by construction. Thus, 
materialmen are not generally within the term "sub-
contractor." 
. /J1f-l, 1'i,, 
See generally said Sec. 52, Materialislll, which is to 
the same effect as 57 CJS Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 89, note 
2, citing Eberle v. Drennan 40 Okla 59, 136 P 162, 51 LRA 
(NS) 68, to the effect that one who furnishes material to 
the contractor is entitled to a lien. 
My main reason for referring to this comment by the 
text is to show that to whom lienors are give liens as 
"materialmen" depends upon the wording of the statute 
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in question. It will also be observed that in some states, 
which is particularly true of the athel- states of California 
and Oregon, the statutes have been changed. The mean-
ing of who is entitled to a machanic' s lien in the State of 
Utah can be ascertained by a reference to the applicable 
statutes which appear to be Sections 38-1-2, 38-1-3 and 
38-1-7. These statutes specify the persons who have a 
right to a mechanic's lien and those specifically not 
mentioned are excluded. Holbrook v. Webster (Utah) 
supra is cited under 38-1-7. 
Again under Point No. IC at page 10 of appellant's 
brief, he states that respondent is a "materialman" and 
not an "original contractor" for the purposes of Sec. 7 and 
cites Sparks v. Butte County Gravel Mining Co. ( 1880) 
,55 Cal 389 and Heacock Sash & Door Co. v. Weatherford 
( 1931) 135 Or. 153, 294 P 344. 
57 CJS Mechanics Liens, Sec. 86 provides: "A me-
chanics lien can be acquired only by a person who is 
within the class or one of the classes of persons to 
whom the lien is given by the Statute or constiutional 
provision under which he claims" citing under note 
24, Riggens v. Perkins (Idaho) 246 P 962, supra. 
36 Am Jur Mechanics Liens, Sec. 52 Materialman, is 
to the same effect: "Materialmen, to be entitled to a lien, 
must be specifically referred to within the statute, for it 
cannot be extended to that classification" citing under 
note Hiln-Hammond Lbr. Co. vs. Elsom (1915) (Calif.) 
154 P 12, and other cases. 
57 CJS Mechanics Liens ( Materialman) Sec. 89 pro-
vides: "While a materialman has been held not to 
-13-
come within some early mechanics' lien statutes re-
stricted to particular class of persons and not men-
tioning a materialman, nevertheless many statutes, 
especially the later ones, expressly confer a lien on a 
materialmen or a person furnishing materials," citing 
under note 75: Idaho Lumber & Hardware Co. v. 
DiGiacomo, 61 Idaho 383, 102 P ( 2d) 637 and Rig-
gens v. Perkins, supra. Heacock Sash & Door Co. v. 
Weatherford ( 1931) 135 Or 153, 294 P 344. 
The text 57 CJS Sec. 89 states: "the rights of material-
men are fixed by law, and nothing that the owner can do 
can change them." Utah Mechanic Lien Statutes do not 
expressly confer a lien on "materialmen." 
It will be observed that the Sparks case, supra, is one 
of ancient vintage, the decision having been rendered 16 
years before Utah became a state, and before publication 
of the Pacific Reports, the first volume of which appears 
to have been published in 1884. The case is reported in 
Pacific State Reports, Book 18, page 389. The statute is 
not quoted but from a reading of the case it would appear 
the decision is based upon a definite classification. From 
Hiln v. Hammond Lbr. Co., supra, it would seem it is no 
longer the law in California. 
141 ALR 323 also cites Hiln-Hammond Lbr. Co. v. 
Elsom ( 1915) 171 Cal. 570, 154 P 12, from which appel-
lant quotes extensively at pages 11-12 of brief. It appears 
from the quote that the word "subcontractor" has a much 
narrower meaining in the mechanic's lien laws which 
divides the liens into four classes, including "materialmen," 
"that the term subcontractor as so used must be deter-
mined by reference to this classification and to the sub-
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ject to which it relates," etc. . . Syllabus 2 indicates the 
decision was rendered because of the peculiar classifica-
tion under the heading "materialmen." Utah statutes have 
no such classification. The Hiln case is also cited in Rig-
gens v. Perkins, supra, at page 964 to the effect that any 
person who contracts direct with the owner is a contractor 
and not a materialman. The decision is a holding in plain-
Liff-respondent' s favor. 
Counsel then at page 11 quotes from 36 Am Jur, Sec. 
52, Materialmen and refers to the Supplement page 7, 
supplement to note 20 page 46, from which it appears 
clearly that it refers to statutes having particular classifi-
cations and so is inapplicable to the case at bar. The very 
next paragraph then refers to Anno: 141 ALR 325, which 
cites Fisher v. Tomlinson 40 Or 111, 66 P 696 and Hea-
cock Sash & Door Co. v. Weatherford 135 Or 135 294 
P 344 which holds that persons who furnish materials 
only are not "materialmen" under statutes not having a 
classification to that effect. These holdings are also in 
plaintiff-respondent's favor. 
The case of Hiln-Hammond Co. v. Elsom cited at page 
11 of brief has already been commented on above. The 
statement quoted from the following case cited. Forsberg 
v. Koss Constr. Co. 218 Ia 818, 252 NW 258, is simply a 
statement made by the court in the course of its opinion 
under the Iowa Statute and can have no application to 
the case at bar. The next case cited, Staples v. Adams, 
Payne & Gleaves 2115 F 322 to which counsel refers is 
simply a holding to the effect that proper notice was not 
served to bring the case within the peculiar provisions of 
the Virginia statute, the construction of which is binding 
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upon the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. As to the 
comments made by counsel pertaining to open or running 
accounts making any difference, or the comments follow-
ing Wilson v. Hind, 1896) 113 Cal. 357, 45 P 685, see 
Jordan v. Natrona Lbr. Co., supra. 
"The fact that a contract, instead of being for a stipu-
lated sum, is what is known as a "cost plus" contract does 
not convert the person contracting with the owner into an 
agent or dissentitle him to a lien as a contractor." See 57 
Mechanics' Liens Sec. 90, Contractors in General, at page 
603. which refers to the cases cited at notes 30 and 31. 
Nor is there any requirement that labor must be bestowed 
on materials to change the form or make them fit in order 
to become a valid lien. It is difficult to see in what manner 
the holding in either of these cases favors appellant's con-
tention. The following case of Fisher v. Tomlinson 40 
Or. 111, 66 P 696 at 697 is a holding to the effect that 
plaintiff, a supplier of building materials, did not come 
within the terms of the lien statute, substance of which is 
given at page 696 and so was not entitled to a lien. Finlay 
v. Tagholm 62 Wash 341, 113 P 1083, 1084 is also a hold-
ing that the statute was not compiled with by delivery of 
a copy of statement showing when materials were deliv-
ered and so not entitled to a lien. The statement quoted 
by counsel at page 14 of brief obviously can have no appli-
cation so far as the case at bar is concerned. Nor can the 
remaining two cases cited at page 14 of brief, Stephens 
Lbr. Co v. Townsend-Stark Corp., 228 Mich 182, 199 
NW 706, 201 NW 213, and Fonnan v. St. Germain, 81 
Minn 26, 83 NW 438, have any application to the facts and 
statute in the case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent believes appellant bases his entire brief 
upon a fallacy: That the applicable statutes, Sec. 38-1-2, 
38-1-3 and 38-1-7 either "contemplates," "defines," "class-
ifies" or "creates" four different classes of liens, one of 
which, that of a "materialman" he then attempts to bring 
respondent within. The Utah Mechanics' Lien Laws 
makes no such classification as I believe has been satis-
factorily shown, directly, nor is there any basis for such 
an inference. It is submitted that in order to have such 
a classification as appellant contends for would require a 
legislative enactment. Nor is there anything in the sta-
tutes requiring that a contract be in any particular form. 
It is common knowledge that construction contracts are 
oral or written, or partly each, with all manner of condi-
tions, specifications, and limitations, and that they may 
be for labor and material or for labor or material only. 
The form is immaterial under Utah Mechanic's Lien laws. 
The question rather is, with whom was the contract made? 
It is believed that the Utah Statutes are clear and concise, 
the meaning and interpretation of all the terms therein 
contained appears from the texts referred to and the 
cases cited by plaintiff-respondent, and as pointed out in 
many of the cases cited by appellant, the meaning of 
the language clarified and the sense thereof fixed, if 
indeed any doubts exists. 
For the reasons given in this brief it is believed that 
appellant has not shown where the lower court has erred 
either as to the facts or the law and that because thereof 
the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is entitled to be 
affirmed and the lower court entitled to modify the same 
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by adding to the amount due the additional costs involved 
in this appeal in accordance with the stipulation entered 
into between the parties. Respondent so prays. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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